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COMMENTS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY-Bowers

v. Hard-

wick - The Supreme Court held in Bowers v. Hardwick1 that a
Georgia statute' making consensual sodomy a crime is constitutional. The statute provides that "a person commits the offense
of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth and anus of
another." 3 The statute carries a maximum penalty of twenty
years imprisonment if convicted." In the wake of controversy
over the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond,8 the Court
granted certiorari in Bowers to justify the proposition that sodomy is not protected as a right of privacy.'
Both the common law and religious doctrine have long held
that sodomy is a detestable and criminal act.7 In addition to the

1. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
2. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6.62 (1984).
3. Id. It is important to note that the statute is gender neutral. The decision of the
Supreme Court holds, however, that the statute is constitutional as far as sodomy between homosexuals is concerned, but does not answer the question whether the statute
as applied to heterosexuals is equally enforceable.
4. Id.
5. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), summarily afl'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976). The decision in Doe involved an action brought by homosexuals in Virginia who sought declaratory relief as to the unconstitutionality of the Virginia anti-sodomy law. The district
court found that the statute was constitutional and that the state's right to enforce such
a law is predicated upon the right of the state to promote morality and decency among it
citizens. Repeal of the law, according to the court, was a task for the legislature, not the
judiciary. The controversy that arose because of the Supreme Court's summary affirmance was the inability of many State and Federal courts to determine the meaning intended by the affirmance. Indeed, in Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985),
the circuit court held that the Doe decision was based on plaintiff's lack of standing to
bring suit and not on any constitutional issue. Contra Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th
Cir. 1985) which held that the Doe decision was based on constitutional grounds.
6. 106 S. Ct. at 2842-43.
7. See Note, Doe and Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes are Constitutional,26 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 645 (1985); Comment, The Right to Privacy and other Constitutional
Challenges to Sodomy Statutes, 15 U. TOL. L. REV. 811 (1984).
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state of Georgia, 8 some 23 other states and the District of Columbia currently have sodomy statutes on their books.' Of these
states, Georgia authorizes one of the longest possible sentences
for conviction. 10 This comment will explain the rationale behind
the majority's opinion in Bowers," by analyzing the majority decision, together with the concurring and dissenting opinions as
they relate to the right of privacy.
I.

DISTRICT COURT AND COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS

A. Facts
Michael Hardwick was arrested in August, 1982 on charges
of committing sodomy in the bedroom of his home with another
consenting adult male.12 After a hearing in the Municipal Court
of Atlanta, his case was transferred to the Superior Court where
the District Attorney decided not to present the case to a grand
jury unless further evidence developed."
Hardwick, in the meantime, filed suit in federal district
court seeking to declare the Georgia statute unconstitutional.'
8. For a history of the Georgia sodomy law, see Evans, The Crimes Against Nature,
16 J. OF PUBL. L. 159 (1967).
9. 106 S. Ct. at 2847 n.1. The states that currently have sodomy laws in effect are:
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia. Most of the sodomy
statutes currently enforced throughout the nation classify consensual sodomy as a misdemeanor. Most states' sodomy statutes are geared toward forced or aggravated sodomy
(i.e., against the individual's will) and sodomy with a minor. Id. In fact, Justice Powell,
in his concurrence, brought up the issue of whether the penalty imposed under the Georgia statute may be violative of the eighth amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment. See infra notes 146-151 and accompanying text.
10. 106 S. Ct. at 2847 n.1. The Georgia statute carries a maximum penalty of up to 20
years imprisonment. Id. Consider the penalty in other states: Florida only carries a 60
day maximum penalty, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 800.02 (West 1987); Kentucky carries a 90 day
to 12 month maximum, Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 510.100 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1986);
Kansas carries a 6 month penalty, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3505 (1986); and Texas carries
only a maximum fine of two hundred dollars, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.06 (Vernon
1974). Note that Kansas changed the wording of its statute in 1983 to make sodomy a
crime only between members of the same sex.
11. Justice White wrote the 5 to 4 majority opinion in which Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor and Chief Justice Burger all joined. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Brennan and Marshall dissented. Justices Blackmun and Stevens wrote dissenting opinions.
12. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985).
13. Id. at 1204.
14. Id.

19871

COMMENTS

He alleged in his complaint that he was a practicing homosexual
who regularly engaged in private homosexual conduct and would
continue to do so in the future. 5 He was joined in the suit by
John and Mary Doe, a heterosexual couple who claimed their
desire to engage in the activity proscribed by the statute but had
been "chilled and deterred" by the existence of the statute and
by Hardwick's arrest. 6 Named as defendants in Hardwick's suit
were the Attorney General of Goergia, the District Attorney of
Fulton County, and the Public Safety Commissioner."7 All three
parties filed motions to dismiss."
The District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
granted the defendants' motions to dismiss holding that the
Does lacked standing to bring suit and that Hardwick, although
he possessed standing, had no legal claim due to the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance of Doe.' 9 Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his suit to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.2
B.

Eleventh Circuit Decision

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the lower court decision. The
reversal was predicated upon two factors: first, the standing of
the parties to bring suit and, second, and more importantly, the
effects of Doe on Hardwick's claim.2 Standing to sue, the court
stated, depended upon whether the threat of prosecution under
the statute was real and immediate or imaginary and speculative.2 2 The likelihood of prosecution is determined by examining
the identity and the interests of the parties involved in the litigation.2 To determine how real or imagined the threat of prosecution is, the court must measure the interests of the state in
enforcing the statute, against the individual's interest in engaging in the prohibited activity.2 According to the Eleventh Cir15.
16.

Id.
Id.

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See supra note 5.
20. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1202.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1205. (Johnson, J., for the Eleventh Circuit majority citing Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974)).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1206.
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cuit, Hardwick's arrest and his admission that he would engage
in the prohibited activity in the future, presented a clear and
immediate threat of future prosecution. Thus, Hardwick's standing to sue was clearly legitimate.2 5 The Does' standing was less
clear.
The Court held that the Does' failure to present any evidence of the likelihood of future prosecution for engaging in sodomy resulted in a lack of standing.2 The Does claimed that the
existence of the statute coupled with the literal applicability to
their situation put them in a position to be prosecuted.2 The
Eleventh Circuit held that absent any evidence which would
prove the likelihood of prosecution under the statute, the Does
had failed to meet their burden.28 The circuit court affirmed the
lower court judgment stating, "[t] he Does did not allege in their
complaint that they faced a serious risk of prosecution" nor did
they claim "membership in a group especially likely to be
prosecuted." 29
The circuit court, however, reversed the district court's dismissal of Hardwick's claim, holding that the Supreme Court's
summary affirmance in Doe was not binding upon Hardwick. 0 A
summary affirmance has binding precedential effect,3 ' but because the court gives no explanation or reason for its decision,
the holding must be carefully construed." A summary affirmance represents the Supreme Court's approval of a lower court
decision, but is not necessarily an endorsement of the lower
court's reasoning. 3 Doe, according to the Eleventh Circuit, was
dismissed in the district court because of the plaintiff's lack of
standing to sue. 4 Since Hardwick clearly had standing, the sum25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The Does only asserted in their complaint that they were "chilled and deterred" by Hardwick's arrest and did not present any evidence that they were involved
in any group that was especially prone to be prosecuted. The Does' failure to request any
evidentiary pre-trial hearing to prove the likelihood of future prosecution left the court
with no alternative but to dismiss their claim.
29. Id.
30. See supra note 5.
31. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
32. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1207.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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mary affirmance was not binding upon him. 5 The court further
reasoned that even if Doe had been decided on constitutional
grounds,3 the Supreme Court had indicated that the constitutionality of such statutes remained an open question.3 7 Summary dispositions bind lower courts only until the Supreme
Court states otherwise. 8 "Developments subsequent to the Doe
decision undermine[d] whatever controlling weight it once may
have possessed." 39
The circuit court held that the Supreme Court's decision in
4 0 which held that
Carey v. Population Services International,
a
state could not impose a restriction on the sale of contraceptives
to minors, implied that the Court had left open the question of
what kind of private consensual behavior could be regulated by
the states.4 2 The court also held that the Supreme Court's dismissal of its original grant of certiorari in New York v.
Uplinger4 3 signalled that the question of state regulation of con44
sensual sexual behavior remained open.
In Uplinger, the New York Court of Appeals held unconstitutional a state statute which prohibited persons from loitering
in a public place for the purpose of engaging in or soliciting another person to engage in deviant sexual behavior.45 The decision in Uplinger was prompted by People v. Onofre,46 which invalidated the New York State sodomy law. The Court's failure
35. See supra note 5.
36. Judge Johnson pointed out that even if the Doe affirmance was binding on Hardwick, the Court did not address the question of whether the Georgia statute violates the
first amendment's freedom of association, as Hardwick alleged in his complaint. Thus,
Hardwick would still have standing to sue. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1208 n.6.
37. Id. at 1208.
38. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
39. 760 F.2d at 1209.
40. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
41. Id. at 700.
42. The court looked to two footnotes in the majority opinion in Carey, which stated
that the "Court has not definitively answered the difficult question of whether and to
what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes from regulating private consensual
sexual behavior among adults." 431 U.S. at 678 nn. 5 & 17.
43. 58 N.Y.2d 936, 447 N.E.2d 62, 460 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1983).
44. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1210.
45. 58 N.Y.2d at 936, 447 N.E.2d at 63, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
46. 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
987 (1981).
47. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1210.
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to hear arguments in Uplinger coupled with its ambiguity in Carey led the circuit court to conclude that the question of the
validity of regulating consensual sexual activity among adults remained open.48
Regardless of Hardwick's standing to sue or whether the
Doe decision was binding, the underlying issue that warranted
examination by the court was whether the state could regulate
consensual sexual activity between adults within the confines of
the home.4'9 The Eleventh Circuit held that prior precedent had

established a right of personal privacy which extended to consensual sexual activity between adults.50 The court took this rationale one step further and declared that the Supreme Court's
holdings in Griswold v. Connecticut,5 1 Eisenstadt v. Baird52 and
Stanley v. Georgia,53 implied a fundamental right to engage in
sodomy.5 4 The court explained that the activity Hardwick
wished to engage in "is so quintessentially private and lies at the
very heart of intimate association" that it is beyond the reach of
state regulation and is protected by the ninth amendment.5 The
Eleventh Circuit remanded the case stating that the state, in order to prevail, must prove that it has a compelling interest in
48. Id. at 1209-10 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17, where the Supreme Court
stated that "the Court does not purport" to answer the question of whether and to what
extent the Constitution prohibits states from regulating sexual behavior between adults).
49. The issue seems to be different depending upon which court is answering the
question. In the Supreme Court's determination, the relevant issue is whether a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy exists. See infra note 69.
50. 760 F.2d at 1211-12 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
51. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
52. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
53. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
54. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212. Both Griswold and Eisenstadt deal with the right to
contraception which is encompassed within an individual's right to privacy. Many courts
have extended the right to contraception to mean that the individuals are free to choose
and regulate their own sexual behavior with that of other consenting adults. 760 F.2d at
1211. In Stanley, the right of privacy was viewed as within the fourth amendment guarantee to be free of intrusive search and seizure. The holding in Stanley seems to suggest
that an individual is free to perform certain adult activity in the home without fear of
unwarranted governmental intrusion as long as that activity is consented to by another
adult partner, and the activity does not threaten others nor violate the rights of others.
Extending and combining the holdings of these cases would constitute a right to engage
in consensual sodomy in the home between consenting adults regardless of gender.
55. Id. "The enumeration in the Constitution, or certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
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regulating the behavior in question, and that the statute is the
most narrowly drawn means of safeguarding that interest."
C.

Dissent

Judge Kravitch dissented in part and concurred in part with
the majority opinion of the Eleventh Circuit.57 While agreeing
that the majority was correct in its conclusion that Hardwick
had proper standing to challenge the constitutionality of the
Georgia statute, Judge Kravitch claimed that the majority erred
in its opinion in two respects." First, the court had no right to
speculate that the summary affirmance of Doe was based upon
the plaintiff's lack of standing.59 The dissent argued that if the
Supreme Court had decided that the plaintiff in Doe lacked
standing, the Court would not have had jurisdiction to hear the
case and would not have been able to summarily affirm the judgment of the district court.60
Second, the dissent argued that the court erred in determining that the summary affirmance of Doe had been undermined
by Carey, Uplinger and Onofre.6 1 The dissent claimed that the
Carey opinion did not leave open the question of whether the
right to privacy invalidated state legislation regulating private
sexual conduct. Rather, the dissent asserted, the Court said that
the right of privacy did not extend as far as plaintiffs in the case
would have liked.6 2 Judge Kravitch further noted that the Supreme Court's dismissal of its writ of certiorari in Uplinger was
not, as the majority asserted, a signal that Doe was no longer
good law.6 s
According to the Eleventh Circuit majority opinion,
Uplinger signalled that Doe was no longer good law based upon
56. 760 F.2d at 1213. The circuit court intimated that the controversy in question
involved a fundamental right thus warranting a strict scrutiny review. The Supreme
Court, on the other hand, found no violation of any fundamental right, and thus found
strict scrutiny inapplicable. 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
57. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1213.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1214.
61. Id.
62. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1215.
63. Id.
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the ambiguity of the Supreme Court's order denying certiorari. 4
The Court's order stated that Uplinger "provides an inappropriate vehicle for resolving the important constitutional issues
raised by the parties."6 The majority inferred this statement as
meaning: 1) that "important constitutional issues" included
whether the right of privacy invalidated all state sodomy laws,
and 2) that the Supreme Court intended to reverse or reconsider Doe, but decided to wait for another case. 6 In his dissent,
Judge Kravitch concluded that these "inferential leaps" were
too great to take and unless and until the Supreme Court indicates otherwise, the courts were bound by the Doe decision. 7
II.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION

A.

Majority Opinion

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the Georgia sodomy statute violated the fundamental rights of
homosexuals.6 8 Two reasons exist why Bowers was chosen for review: first, other circuit courts had reached conclusions contrary
to that decided by the Eleventh Circuit"9 and, second, to judge
"the limits of the court's role in carrying out its constitutional
mandate. '7 0
%
The respondent advanced three arguments as to why the
Georgia statute was unconstitutional.7 1 Hardwick asserted:
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 1210.
Id.
Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1216.
Id.
Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843. Justice White stated that:
The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the
laws of the many states that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for
a very long time. The case also calls for some judgment about the limits of the
Court's role in carrying out its constitutional mandate.
69. 106 S. Ct. at 2843 & n.3 (citing Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985) and
Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Note also that several states have
recently arrived at decisions similar to that of the Eleventh Circuit. See, e.g., People v.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
987 (1981); State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976); and Commonwealth v.
Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980). All three cases were decided subsequent to the
Doe decision.
70. 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
71. Many commentators suggest four arguments as to the unconstitutionality of sodomy statutes. These arguments are: 1) they are void for overbreadth and vagueness; 2)
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1) that prior precedent has established a right of privacy which
infers a right to engage in consensual sexual activity;7 2 2) that
prior precedent aside, there exists a fundamental right to engage
in sodomy; 73 and 3) that even if a fundamental right to engage
in sodomy does not exist, no rational basis exists for the law,
thereby invalidating the statute. 7 '
1. The Right to Engage in Sodomy is Not Inferred from the
Right of Privacy Doctrine
Justice White, writing for the majority, asserted that prior
precedent concerning the right of individual privacy did not apply in this case. 75 He claimed that prior right of privacy cases
such as Griswold, Eisenstadt, Carey and Roe v. Wade, dealt
with issues of family, marriage, and procreation.7 6 No relation
exists, nor had respondent demonstrated any, between family,
marriage or procreation, and homosexual activity.7 7 Justice
White construed the issue in Bowers as "whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy."78
The right to engage in homosexual sodomy does not warrant
the same protection as has been given in prior cases dealing with
a right to privacy because those cases have dealt primarily with
family relationships 9 and child rearing.8 0 Sodomy, claimed the
they impose cruel and unusual punishment; 3) they invade the right to privacy; and 4)
they violate the equal protection clause. See, Note, The Constitutionality of Sodomy
Statutes 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 553 (1976) [hereinafter The Constitutionalityof Sodomy
Statutes]; see, also, Note, Expanding the Rights of Sexual Privacy, 27 Loy. L. REv. 1279
(1981).
72. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
73. Id. at 2844.
74. Id. at 2846.
75. Id. at 2844.
76. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2843. The statute on its face is gender neutral, yet the majority only sought
to determine its applicability to homosexuals. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-2 (1984); see,
also, supra note 3. Justice Blackmun brought up this very point in his dissent. See 106
S. Ct. at 2849.
79. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (focusing upon the right of religious freedom).
80. 106 S. Ct. at 2843. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (focusing
upon the right of parents to educate their children as they choose).
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Court, bears no resemblance to either category." More recent
cases, however, have dealt with the right of privacy concerning
contraception," abortion,83 and obscenity.8 4 The majority held
that this line of cases did not support the proposition that consensual activity is within the realm of the privacy doctrine.85
Most notably, Justice White observed that the Court emphasized in Carey that the privacy right, protected by the due process clause under the Griswold line of cases did not extend to
consensual sexual activity.8
The right of privacy invoked by the respondent was based
upon Griswold and those cases subsequently decided. 7 Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority in Griswold, stated that the
rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights have "penumbras" which
are "formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance."88 He held that "various guarantees
create zones of privacy." 8 9 Justice Douglas voiced his concern
about the invasion of the marital relationship stating, "would we
allow the police to search the sacred precincts of the marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?"90 For
Justice White, in Bowers, a right to privacy does not exist in a
vacuum, but rather, it is the nature of certain interpersonal relationships that confer the right.9 Sodomy is not encompassed
within these relationships and is thus afforded no protection. 2
81. 106 S.Ct. at 2844.
82. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972).
83. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
84. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). See also supra note 54.
85. 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
86. Id. Contra Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d at 1205. See also supra note 42 and
accompanying text.

87. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Carey v. Population Services Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Griswold has become the
so-called "father" of the right to privacy doctrine.
88. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
89. Id. Applying these principles, Justice Douglas held that a state law prohibiting
married couples from access to contraception was unconstitutional and an invasion of
the marital relationship.
90. Id. at 485. We should also question whether we would or should allow the police
to search any bedroom for telltale signs of consensual sodomy.
91. Bowers, 106 S.Ct. at 2844.
92. Id.
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Justice White's concurring opinion in Griswold stated that restricting the use of contraceptives by married couples deprived
them of liberty without due process, a violation of the fourteenth amendment.9 3 While agreeing that married couples could
not be restricted from obtaining contraception, Justice White
implied that a state law prohibiting individuals wishing to engage in illicit sexual relations from obtaining contraception
would be within the state's power. 4
Seven years after the Griswold decision, the Court held in
Eisenstadt v. Baird that the right to contraception is afforded to
non-married couples as well as to married. 5 Justice Brennan
wrote the majortiy opinion holding that a prohibition against
the use of contraceptives by unmarried individuals was violative
of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.9
The important factor to consider in Justice Brennan's view is
that regardless of whether the right to contraception is inferred
in the marital relationship, 97 it is the fact that the right of privacy, if it is to mean anything, is "the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the
decision whether to bear or beget a child." 8 This indicates the
view that individuals have the right to engage in intimate interpersonal relationships and decision making free of governmental
intrusion. Read in conjunction, Griswold and Eisenstadt imply
that an individual's private, intimate decisions regarding the nature of his interpersonal relationships are protected as fundamental rights of privacy. 9
93. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502.
94. Id. at 505-06. Justice White wrote that State proscriptions against illicit sexual
relations are constitutionally void. See also Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 463-65.
95. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 438. Justice White, concurring in the majority opinion,
bases his concurrence upon constitutional doctrine (i.e., that a conviction cannot be "upheld upon a theory which could not constitutionally support a verdict' "). Id. at 465
(quoting Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 586 (1969)). True to his concurrence in Griswold, Justice White stated that he "perceive[d] no reason for reaching the novel constitutional question whether a State may restrict or forbid the distribution of contraceptives to the unmarried." Id. at 465.
96. Id. at 443.
97. See, Griswold, 381 U.S. at 502-06.
98. 405 U.S. at 453.
99. See, Bowers, 106 S.Ct. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In Stanley v. Georgia,"' which held that an individual may
view obscene materials in the privacy of his home free of governmental intrusion, the Court proclaimed that the constitutional
heritage of the United States "rebels at the thought of giving
government the power to control men's minds."101 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Stanley, held that a state's assertion that it has the right to protect individuals from the effects of obscenity is nothing more "than the assertion that the
state has the right to control the moral content of a person's
thoughts."' 02 Stanley implies that a right of privacy extends to
certain activities which occur within the confines of the home
which might not be protected outside the home.'08
In rejecting the argument that Stanley held that private
adult behavior which occurs in the home is insulated from governmental intrusion, Justice White in Bowers asserted that
Stanley encompassed strictly a first amendment issue.10 4 Since
the respondent presented no first amendment argument, Stanley was not controlling in this case. 105 Distinguishing Stanley,
and rejecting the notion that the violation of the due process
clause found in Griswold, Eisenstadt,and Roe'0 6 extends to sodomy, Justice White next refuted the argument that a fundamen07
tal right to engage in sodomy exists.1

100. 394 U.S. 557 (1967) (appellant was arrested in his home after police, armed with
a warrant to search his home for evidence of illicit bookmaking activity, came across
obscene films in his bedroom; appellant was then charged and convicted of violating a
Georgia statute banning the possession of obscene material).
101. Id. at 565.
102. Id.
103. Justice Marshall stated that "whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own
home." Id.
104. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
105. Id. But see court of appeals decision, Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th
Cir. 1985).
106. In Roe, the Supreme Court held that a Texas statute banning abortion was a
violation of the due process clause.
107. 106 S. Ct. at 2844. The excuse that the relationships dealt with in the Griswold
line of cases relate to marriage and procreation is inadequate. It is not the relationships
themselves, but rather, the nature of the relationships which should confer protection. In
other words, the fact that the relationships deal with intimate and private association
amongst and between individuals is the primary reason why a right of privacy is inferred.
Classification of the relationship as homosexual or heterosexual is unnecessary. These
relationships simply deal with the right of an individual to choose with whom he or she
wishes to associate and with whom he or she wishes to share intimate and personal rela-
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There is No Fundamental Right to Engage in Sodomy

Respondent argued, and the Eleventh Circuit held, ' that a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy exists.'0
Justice White explained that the Court must go to great lengths
to substantiate a position that a fundamental right exists." 0
Fundamental rights have been defined as those rights which
qualify for heightened judicial protection."' They have been described as "those fundamental liberties that are 'implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty' such that 'neither liberty nor justice
would exist if they were sacrificed.' 1112 Fundamental rights have
also been characterized as "those liberties that are 'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' "'Is The concept
that fundamental rights are deeply rooted in our nation's history
was advanced by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion to
Griswold in which he described the ninth amendment as preserving a fundamental right of privacy to the people." 4 The concept of looking to the intent of the framers to determine what
fundamental rights exist is a crucial factor in Justice White's
opinion in Bowers'" 5-thus he adopts the Goldberg approach
used in Griswold.
Looking to past proscriptions against sodomy, Justice White
determined that no fundamental right exists to engage in sodomy."' Proscriptions against sodomy were firmly planted at the
time of the ratification of the Constitution evidencing a tradition
that has long held sodomy a crime." 7 Sodomy had been a crime
in all thirteen states that ratified the Bill of Rights; all but five
of the thirty-seven states at the time of the ratification of the
fourteenth amendment outlawed sodomy; and up until 1961 all
tionships. In light of this distinction, the argument advanced by the Court is weakened.
108. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
109. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
110. Id. at 2846.
111. Id. at 2944.
112. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
113. Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
114. 381 U.S. at 486, 488-93 (Goldberg, J. concurring).
115. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
116. Id. For a further discussion of the ancient proscriptions against sodomy and
other deviant sexual practices, see Richards, Unnatural Acts and the Constitutional
Right to Privacy: A Moral Theory, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 1281 (1976).
117. 106 S. Ct. at 2844-46.
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fifty states outlawed sodomy." 8

The respondent next argued that, conceding no fundamental right to engage in sodomy exists, the Court should discover a
new fundamental right embedded in the constitution." 9
Justice White held that there should be "great resistance"
by the Court to creation of new fundamental rights from the due
process clause. 20 The Judiciary, by expanding fundamental
rights, "takes to itself further authority to govern the country
without express Constitutional authority," and the Court "is
most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals
with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution."''
The respondent argued that Stanley had created a fundamental right of privacy to engage in consensual sexual activity in
the home,"' and even if Stanley was found not to be controlling,
the Georgia statute served no useful purpose since consensual
sodomy is basically a victimless act. 23 The Court rejected both
arguments." 4 Stanley, maintained the Court, was firmly
grounded in first amendment rights and hence not controlling
since the respondent's claim rested on fourteenth amendment
grounds. 25 Second, victimless crimes are no less criminal simply
because they occur in the home.' 26 The Court further stated that
were it to allow such voluntary consensual adult activity in the
home, "it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed
right to homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest and other sexual crimes.'

2 7

118. Id. at 2844-45.
119. Id. at 2846.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. See generally, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
123. Bowers, S. Ct. at 2846.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The Court argued that possession of firearms and drugs are no less dangerous simply because they occur in the home. What the Court fails to recognize is that
drugs and firearms are inherently dangerous and the state has a compelling interest in
deterring their use. The same cannot be said of sodomy.
127. Id. at 2846. The Court seems to confuse the issue-state governments regulate
behavior such as adultery, incest, rape and child molestation because of the compelling
state interests in protecting the preservation of the family and the prevention of physical
and emotional harm. A similar argument cannot be made of consensual sodomy occuring
in the home.
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Morality is a Justifiable Rationale for the Sodomy Law

Respondent argued that even if prior precedent was not
controlling in the determination of whether a fundamental right
to engage in sodomy exists, and even if no fundamental right to
engage in sodomy can be found in the Constitution, the Georgia
statute is still unconstitutional because there is no rational basis
for the law's existence except the "presumed belief of a majority
of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral
and unacceptable."' 12 8 The Court refuted the argument that morality is an inadequate rationale for the law, holding that "[t]he
law, however, is constantly based upon notions of morality, and
if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very
busy indeed."'2 9
A serious flaw in the Court's reasoning is that morality is a
concept which is constantly changing and evolving. 3 0 Notions of
morality must be weighed against the intent of the framers who,
as Justice Brandeis once stated, "undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness."' 3' The question becomes,
should morality impinge on the fundamental right to pursue
one's own happiness as it relates to engaging in consensual adult
sexual behavior? 13 2 Upholding morality, it is argued, is a compel128. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
129. Id.
130. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Also, compare Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Had notions of
morality not changed in America we would never have passed the fourteenth amendment, nor allowed women to vote, nor integrated our school system, nor allowed interracial marriage. To merely dismiss the respondent's argument that morality is an insufficient basis to uphold the validity of the law is to do a disservice to the American system.
The Court simply states that morality is a satisfactory rationale to uphold the law. Although this writer would agree with the Court to some extent, it would seem to be a
worthless proposition without the Court's investigation as to the current moral trend in
the nation. The Court's disregard for the number of states that have repealed sodomy
laws and the number of states in which sodomy has been decriminalized, shows no deference to the feelings and desires of the American public.
131. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The right to engage in intimate relationships is encompassed in the pursuit of happiness.
The individual's choice of with whom they wish to share private thoughts, feelings, expressions and social relations should be protected under the edict of the "pursuit of happiness." See supra note 108.
132. This is not meant to suggest that all law based upon notions of morality are
void. It does suggest, however, that absent a compelling state interest, behavior such as
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ling state interest because it serves to preserve and foster the
social welfare of the people. 33 Further, it helps to enhance the
general mental and physical health of the individuals in society. 34 Ideas concerning the value of morality in our society
should be balanced against the principles established by our
founding fathers who encompassed within the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution notions of morality within the
realm of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In Olmstead
33 Justice Brandeis, in discussing
v. United States,1
the intent of
the framers in adopting the Bill of Rights stated:
They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.'3 6
The Supreme Court felt, however, that a majoritarian belief
that sodomy is morally wrong is an adequate rationale for the
law's existence.3 7 The Court reversed the appeals court ruling,
commenting that the sodomy laws of some 25 States should not
be invalidated on the basis that morality is an inadequate justification for the law. 38 The Court's opinion ended with a footnote

indicating that respondent's failure to defend the judgment of
the court of appeals on the ninth amendment, the equal protection clause or the eighth amendment, warranted no review of
those issues by the Court at this time.'39
sodomy which occurs in the home between consenting adults should be beyond the reach
of state power.
133. See generally Richards, supra note 116.
134. At least one commentator has written that proscriptions against homosexual
sodomy are valid because they help in deterring the spread of AIDS. See Brook, Doe and
Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes are Constitutional,26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 645 (1985).
135. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
136. Id. at 478 (emphasis added).
137. 106 S. Ct. at 2846. "The law is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all
laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated . . . the court will be
very busy indeed." Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2846 n.8. Does the Court mean to infer that if Hardwick presented those
issues he may have prevailed? Also, if the Court recognized that those issues do exist,
then doesn't it have the duty to address them? See infra notes 171-72 and accompanying
text. The Court used a rational relation test in deciding Bowers. Query whether the
Court should have used a middle tier or strict scrutiny test in its determination. The
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B.

Concurring Opinions

1. Chief Justice Burger
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the Court's judgment and
wrote separately to emphasize that the constitution does not
grant a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy."1 0
The Chief Justice discussed the ancient proscriptions against
sodomy and traced their roots throughout western civilization. 4"
To confer a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy
"would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.' 4 2 The
most important distinction in this case according to Chief Justice Burger is not "a question of 'personal' preferences but
rather of the legislative authority of the state."'4 M He found
"nothing in the Constitution depriving a state of the power to
enact the statute challenged here." 4 4 Chief Justice Burger's belief that the legislative authority controls the outcome of this
case echoes that of Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Carey,' 45 in which he stated:
Court implied that no suspect classification is involved in the present case, therefore,
strict scrutiny is inapplicable. In Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289 (1985), a case similar to
Bowers challenging the Texas sodomy law, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
Because we have held that engaging in homosexual conduct is not a constitutionally protected liberty interest and because Baker has not cited any cases
holding, and we refuse to hold, that homosexuals constitute a suspect or quasisuspect classification, the standard of review is whether section 21.06 is rationally related to a legitimate state end.
Id. at 292.
It is yet to be seen whether homosexuals can be considered a suspect class. But, if
we hold for the moment that a sodomy statute cannot be enforced to restrict married or
heterosexual couples, as Griswold and Eisenstadt imply, from engaging in sodomy, then
a law restricting homosexuals would be violative of the equal protection clause. This
would be so because it would restrict what a man may do with another man while allowing a man to engage in that behavior with a woman. In such a case the Court would
at least invoke middle tier scrutiny (i.e., gender based discrimination). What it basically
comes down to is that the issue of whether homosexuals may engage in sodomy cannot
be fully determined unless the Court rules on whether heterosexuals may.
140. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847. See supra note 69.
141. Id. See supra note 116. The idea that proscriptions against sodomy should
somehow be a factor in deciding the constitutionality of the sodomy statute can also be
found in Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985).
142. 106 S. Ct. at 2847.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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The court here in effect holds that the first and fourteenth amendments not only guarantee full and free debate before a legislative judgment as to the moral dangers to which minors within the jurisdiction of the state
should not be subjected but goes further and absolutely
prevents the representatives of the majority from carrying out such a policy after the issues have been fully
aired. 46
While agreeing that no fundamental right to engage in sodomy is encompassed by any of the previously decided right of
privacy cases (Griswold, etc.), the factor most important to the
Chief Justice was the right of the state legislatures to regulate
certain behavior of its citizens based on traditional notions of
morality. The very essence of this case, however, contrary to the
Chief Justice's belief, is whether a right to engage in sodomy is
protected under a constitutional "zone of privacy."
2. Justice Powell
Justice Powell concurred in the majority opinion,147 but
noted that while he agreed that no fundamental right to engage
in sodomy exists under the due process clause, the respondent
may still have been entitled to some protection by the eighth
amendment.14 8 In his view, the Georgia statute, which carries a
twenty-year sentence for a conviction of a single private consensual act, 4 9 creates a serious eighth amendment issue.150 Under
the Georgia statute, "a single act of sodomy even in the private
setting of a home is a felony comparable in terms of the possible
sentence imposed to serious felonies such as aggravated battery,
first degree arson and robbery.'

15

' Justice Powell goes no further

146. Id. at 718 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
147. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847. (Powell, J., concurring).
148. Id. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
149. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-6-2 (1984). In fact, among states that currently have sodomy laws, only Georgia and Rhode Island carry maximum penalties of up to 20 years
imprisonment. See 106 S. Ct. at 2847 & n.1 (citing R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 11-10-1 (1981)). For
a comparison of penalties between conviction for sodomy and for manslaughter among
the states which currently have sodomy statutes, see The Constitutionalityof Sodomy
Statutes, supra note 72.
150. 106 S. Ct. at 2847.
151. Id.
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in his analysis and leaves the eighth amendment issue open for
future decision. 15 His rationale for not deciding the issue was
that Hardwick had "not been tried, much less convicted and
sentenced."' 5 Therefore the issue was not a factor in the Court's
decision. 15 Additionally, it was admitted at oral argument that
prior to the complaint filed against Hardwick there had been no
reported decision involving prosecution for private homosexual
sodomy in several decades.1 55 While inferring that the Georgia
statute may be unconstitutional under the eighth amendment,
Justice Powell nonetheless believed that a state has the right to
enact such a statute.' 56 In his concurring opinion to Carey, Justice Powell held that Griswold and Roe had been overextended
in cases dealing wih sexual freedom. He stated, "neither our
precedents nor sound principles of constitutional analysis requires state legislation to meet the exacting compelling state interest standard whenever it implicates sexual freedom."' 57 This
statement is in conformity with the majority's opinion in Bowers
which used a rational relation test to scrutinize the constitutional validity of the Georgia statute.'5 8 It would seem that Justice Powell wrote his concurrence in order to alert future litigants challenging a sodomy statute that review of the law should
be predicated upon an argument that the statute violates the
eighth amendment. Thus it appears that Bowers leaves room for
an eventual rehearing of the issue.
C. Dissenting Opinions
1. Justice Blackmun
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall
and Stevens, wrote a vigorous dissent which attacked the major152. Id.
153. Id. at 2848.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2848 n.2. Justice Powell stated further that the suit had been brought by
Hardwick for declaratory judgment challenging the validity of the statute. Although 26
states have repealed similar sodomy statutes, he refused to create a fundamental right
for a behavior condemned for hundreds of years.
156. Id.
157. 431 U.S. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring).
158. See 106 S. Ct. at 2846. See also supra note 139.
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ity's rationale for upholding the validity of the statute.15 9 The
dissent focused upon three faults in the majority's reasoning:
1) the framing of the issue by the majority;1 60 2) the Court's interpretation of the decision in Stanley v. Georgia;"' and
3) "[tjhe Court's failure to comprehend the magnitude of the
liberty interests at stake."' 6 2 This case, it is asserted, is simply
about "the right to be let alone."' 68 Justice Blackmun disagreed
with the majority opinion that the Georgia statute is valid essentially because the laws of several states have made such conduct
illegal for a very long time."" Quoting Justice Holmes, Justice
Blackmun stated:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law
than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It
is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was
laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
65
persists from blind imitation of the past.
The notion that the state's idea of morality is a justified interest
in upholding the sodomy law is meritless according to Justice
Blackmun. 6 6
Justice Blackmun asserted that "the Court's almost obsessive focus on homosexual activity" resulted in the failure to realize that the statute is written in gender neutral terms; 67 the sex
or status of the persons engaging in the act is irrelevant. 6 8
The majority should not have decided whether a fundamental right to engage in sodomy exists, but rather, the Court
should have focused upon whether the statute is or is not a constitutional intrusion into the right to privacy, independent of
sexual orientation." 9 According to Justice Blackmun, the statute
must be applied to all individuals regardless of sexual
159. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2848.
160. Id. See also supra note 69.
161. 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (citing Stanley, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)).
162. Id. at 2853.
163. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2848 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897)).
166. Id.
167. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849. See also supra notes 2 & 139.

168. Id.
169. Id.
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preference.17 0

Justice Blackmun also stated that the majority erred when
it failed to address any eighth or ninth amendment, or equal
protection clause claim. 17 1 He asserted that the duty of the Supreme Court is to "affirm the Court of Appeals' judgment if
there is any ground on which respondent may be entitled to relief. '172 In fact, Hardwick did present issues based on the ninth
amendment17 3 by way of Griswold. 74 Justice Goldberg, concur-

ring in Griswold, wrote that, "[t]he language and history of the
ninth amendment reveal that the framers of the Constitution
believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected
from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those
fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments."'7

5

As Justice Goldberg further elabo-

rated, "the ninth amendment shows a belief. . . that fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first
eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included
there not be deemed exhaustive.

1 76

In Justice Blackmun's view,

the Court in Bowers had a duty to explore all possible areas
which would entitle the respondent to relief. 177 Thus, even if the
respondent failed to advance these claims, the Court should not
7
pass over the issues if they are found to exist.1 1
The dissent stated that the respondent had made a "cognizable claim" that the sodomy law interfered with his constitutional right of privacy and freedom of association such that the
eighth and ninth amendment as well as the equal protection
clause claims should not have been "peremptorily dismissed.' ' 7 9
The majority's "cramped reading of the issue," stated Justice
Blackmun, "makes for a short opinion but does little to make for
170. Id.
171. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849-50.
172. Id. at 2849.
173. For text of ninth amendment, see supra note 57.
174. 106 S. Ct. at 2849 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484). In Griswold, Justice Douglas held that the "Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that help give them life and substance." Further, that encompassed in these
penumbras is a zone of privacy. 381 U.S. at 484.
175. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488.
176. Id. at 492.
177. 106 S. Ct. at 2849.
178. Id. at 2850.
179. Id.
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a persuasive one. '
The development and recognition of all applicable constitutional issues is a critical factor in determining whether a fundamental right exists."'8 Griswold and the cases decided subsequently have expanded the right of marital privacy from that of
marital privacy to rights involving intimate association and private personal choice and decision making.' 8 2 The constitutional
question posed in Bowers falls into a category involving that of
intimate association and private personal choice in matters regarding one's own body.8' Though sodomy is considered outside
the norm, it nonetheless involves a private personal decision
concerning with whom one wishes to associate and with what
one wishes to do with one's body.
The development of a right to privacy and freedom of
choice can be traced in Roe, Stanley, and Carey. In Roe, the
Court held that a right to an abortion can be found in the fourteenth amendment concept of personal liberty as well as in the
ninth amendment.18 4 Similarly, in Stanley, the Court held that
the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, are protected by the first and fourteenth amend180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
183. If Roe stands for anything, it is the right individuals have to make a choice, free
of governmental intrusion, as to what one wishes to do with her body. This is not to
suggest that the state or the Court should condone, for example, a person's right to selfmutilation, but does suggest that a person may use their body to engage in consensual
sexual activity with another adult. This would hold true whether the behavior be sodomy, sado-masochism, etc.
184. Roe 410 U.S. at 153. It is difficult to ascertain how a court can rule that abortion
is legal while sodomy is not. The state's interest in the abortion issue is much more
compelling than its interest in controlling sodomy. As regards the abortion issue, the
courts and society are dealing with the question of whether we are destroying human life
by allowing abortions. The sodomy issue deals with whether the state has a compelling
enough reason to control the private consensual sexual activity of adults. According to
Roe, a woman has a fundamental right to make an intimate and personal choice regarding the use of her body (i.e., a woman is allowed to terminate her pregnancy in the first
trimester). However, in certain states that same woman could not engage or perform oral
or anal sex with another consenting adult. See supra note 9. This seems to be inconsistent. The court will allow a woman to terminate a fetus (what some may call "potential
life"), but will not allow her to make an intimate choice regarding the nature of her
sexual and personal relationships with another adult. Why should the court allow a woman to make an extremely personal choice about abortion, yet restrict the right of two
consenting adults to carry on their sexual relationship in a mutually satisfying and stimulating manner?
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ments.' 85 Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Stanley,

held, "[i]f the first amendment means anything, it means that a
state has no business telling a man sitting alone in his own
'
house what books he may read or what films he may watch."186
In Carey, the Court determined that the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment conferred a fundamental right to
decide "whether or not to bear or beget a child."' 87 Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Carey, held that the right of
minors to obtain contraception exists "because such access is
' 88
. . [a] constitutionally protected right of childbearing.'
In its decision that sodomy is not constitutionally protected,
the Court gave little deference to the "zone of privacy" that it
had mandated in the Griswold line of cases.' 89 The critical determination that the Court made in its opinion regarding Griswold and its progeny is the type of relationships that the Court
sought to protect in those cases.' 90 The Court held that the special nature of family, procreation, and marital relationships warrants a higher level of protection than other relationships, for
example, homosexual ones.' 9 ' The crucial determination expressed by Justice Blackmun is not a matter of what the relationships stand for but why we protect those relationships in the
92
*

first place.'

The Supreme Court has proceeded along two distinct lines
in right to privacy cases. First, "it has recognized a privacy interest with reference to certain decisions that are properly for
the individual to make."' 93 Second, "it has recognized a privacy
185. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 557.
186. Id. at 565. Doesn't it also mean that a state has no business telling a man whom
he may have sex with in his home or in what manner he performs it? Freedom of sexual
expression can be encompassed as an "emanation" of free speech guaranteed by the first
amendment.
187. Carey, 431 U.S. at 686.
188. Id. at 688. Similarly the issue should not be whether a fundamental right to
engage in sodomy exists, but whether a fundamental right of interpersonal association is
being violated by the Georgia law.
189. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2852. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Carey
v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); and Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969).
190. 106 S. Ct. at 2851-52. See also supra note 107.
191. 106 S. Ct. at 2851.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2850. Roe falls into this category.
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interest with reference to certain places without regard for the
particular activities in which the individuals who occupy them
are engaged."' 194 Justice Blackmun postulated that the right of
privacy thus embodied decisional as well as spatial aspects. 19
Bowers presents both these aspects.
The majority's conclusion that none of the rights delineated
in the Court's prior decisions dealing with an individual's right
to make certain decisions free of governmental intrusion bore
any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right to engage in
acts of sodomy ignores the warning, according to Justice Blackmun, "against 'clos[ing] our eyes to the basic reasons why certain rights associated with the family have been accorded shelter
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.' """e
Those rights are protected "not because they contribute, in some
direct and material way, to the general public's welfare, but because they form a central part of an individual's life."' 9 7 Justice
Blackmun concluded, "we protect the decision whether to marry
precisely because marriage 'is an association that promotes a
way of life,' ,19' "we protect the decision whether to have a child
because parenthood alters so dramatically an individual's self
definition,"' 9 9 and "we protect the family because it contributes
' 20 0
so powerfully to the happiness of individuals.
Building upon these premises, Justice Blackmun maintained that only "willfull blindness could obscure the fact that
sexual intimacy is a 'sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality.' ""
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with
others suggests . . . that there may be many 'right' ways
of conducting those relationships, and that much of the
richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an
194. Id. at 2850-51. Stanley falls into this category.
195. Id. at 2844.
196. 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977)).
197. Id.
198. Id. (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486).
199. Id.
200. 106 S. Ct. at 2851.
201. Id. (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973)).
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individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds. 022
Inherent in the premise that individuals have the right to
choose how to conduct their lives is an acceptance that individuals will make different choices.20 3 Justice Blackmun argued that
a "way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no
rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is

different. ' 2 0 4 The majority opinion, which held that a fundamen-

tal right to engage in sodomy does not exist, 0 5 is, in actuality,
according to Justice Blackmun, a failure of the Court to recognize a "fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling
the nature of their intimate associations with others.

20
' 6

The second aspect of the privacy issue is its spatial dimension. Justice Blackmun stated that the possible prosecution that
the respondent faced presented a fourth amendment issue. 07
Relying upon the Court's holding in Stanley, Justice Blackmun
held that the fourth amendment provides special protection for
the individual in his home. 08 Stanley, however, only briefly
touched on the fourth amendment. Justice Stewart, concurring
in Stanley, voiced his concern that if the Court were to uphold
the conviction of the defendant it would:
[I]nvite a government official to use a seemingly precise
and legal warrant only as a ticket to get into a man's
home, and, once inside, to launch forth upon unconfined
searches and indiscriminate seizures as if armed with all
the unbridled and illegal power of a general warrant. 0 9
Justice Stewart's opinion in Stanley was consistent with
that of Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United
States. 10 Justice Brandeis expressed his belief that an individ202. Id.
203. Id. at 2852.
204. 106 S. Ct. at 2852 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-24 (1972)).
205. Id. at 2844.
206. Id. at 2852. Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
207. 106 S. Ct. at 2852.
208. Id.
209. 394 U.S. at 572 (Stewart, J., concurring). Query whether suspicion that acts of
sodomy are being committed in a person's home gives probable cause for the state to
enter that home?
210. 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also supra note 131.
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ual has a right to satisfy his own intellectual and emotional
needs in the privacy of his own home.2" ' The reliance of the
Stanley Court upon Olmstead suggests that Stanley rested as
much on the fourth amendment as on the first.2 12 Relying on
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,1 3 Justice Blackmun in Bowers
asserted that Stanley stood for a reaffirmation that "a man's
home is his castle." 2 1 The very "heart of the Constitution's protection of privacy is the right of an individual to conduct inti'2 1 5
mate relationships in the intimacy of his or her own home. "
The petitioner's justification for supporting the proposition
that the Georgia statute furthered legitimate state interests was
incorrect in Justice Blackmun's view. 21 ' The petitioner asserted
that the acts made criminal by the statute may have serious adverse consequences to society such as the spread of communicable diseases or fostering other criminal behavior. 1

Justice White stated for the majority in Bowers that otherwise victimless crimes are no less criminal because they occur
within the confines of the home. 218 Justice Blackmun saw no justification for equating private consensual sexual conduct with
21 9
the possession in the home of drugs, guns or stolen property.
Nothing in the record before the Court provided any justifica-

tion for finding that sodomy posed any danger to the persons so
engaged or to others.2 20
211. Id. at 478.
212. 106 S. Ct. at 2852-53.
213. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
214. 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (quoting Paris Adult Theater I, 413 U.S. at 66).
215. Id. Cf. United States v. Buck, 342 A.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1975). The District of Columbia court held in Buck that a right of privacy for individuals to engage in sodomy
does not extend beyond the seclusion of the home. This decision is interesting in light of
the fact that the District of Columbia currently has a sodomy law in effect. The court's
conclusion supports Justice Blackmun's notion of a partial right of privacy. This at least
suggests that the court has an option in deciding future cases challenging the constitutional validity of sodomy laws.
216. 106 S. Ct. at 2853.
217. Id. See also supra note 134.
218. 106 S. Ct. at 2846. "Victimless crimes, such as the possession and use of illegal
drugs do not escape the law where they are committed at home." Id. Justice Black in
Stanley stated that the Court's holding "in no way infringes upon the power of the State
or Federal government to make possession of other items such as narcotics, firearms or
stolen goods a crime." 394 U.S. at 568 n.11.
219. 106 S. Ct. at 2853. Drugs and firearms are inherently dangerous, and for property to have been stolen, someone must have been wrongfully deprived of it.
220. Id. But cf. Brook, supra note 134.
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A second justification posed by the petitioner was that
Georgia had a right to uphold the moral welfare of its citizens by
proscribing deviant activity.22 ' Petitioner argued that ancient
proscriptions against sodomy are sufficient enough reasons for
the state to ban it today.222 In Justice Blackmun's view, the notion that "the length of time a majority has held its convictions
or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this Court's scrutiny," is without merit.2 23 Justice
Blackmun drew a parallel between Loving v. Virginia21" and

Bowers.225 The Loving Court had held that the justification for
the original anti-miscegenation statute was no longer compelling
and that the freedom of choice to marry "had long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness of free men.

'226

The basis for anti-miscege-

nation statutes was reliance upon religious beliefs that God had
227
kept all races of the world separate so they would not mix.

According to Justice Blackmun, traditional Judeo-Christian values which proscribe sodomy do not "provide an adequate justification" for a sodomy law. 228 The fact that certain, but not all,

religious groups condemn the behavior at issue gives the states
no more power to regulate that behavior than it would to punish
such behavior because of "racial animus. ' 22 ' The remainder of
Justice Blackmun's dissent focused upon his disagreement with
the State of Georgia's assertion that its position was justified by
a "morally neutral" exercise
of the State's power to "protect the
30
public environment.

2

221. 106 S. Ct. at 2854. Petitioner argued that the respondent and others who engage
in "the conduct prohibited by §§ 16-6-2 interfere with Georgia's exercise of the 'right of
the Nation and of the States to maintain a decent society.'" Id. (quoting Paris Adult
Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 59-60).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
225. 106 S. Ct. at 2854 n.5. In Loving, the Supreme Court found Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute to be unconstitutional. Id. (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 3, 7-12).
226. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
227. Id. at 3.
228. 106 S. Ct. at 2854.
229. Id. at 2855. Justice Blackmun stated that "[n]o matter how uncomfortable a
certain group may make the majority of this Court, we have held that '[miere public
intolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's
physical liberty.'" Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975)).
230. Id. (quoting Paris Adult Thetre I, 413 U.S. at 68-69).
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People will not abandon morality simply because certain
private sexual conduct deemed deviant is not punished by
law.2" There is a difference between laws that protect public
sensibilities and those that enforce private morality. 232 In Paris
Adult Theatre I great deference was given to the Court's holding in Stanley.2 s The Court stated that it declined to "equate
privacy of the'home . . .with a zone of privacy that follows a
distributor or consumer of obscene materials wherever he
goes. "234 The sanctity of the home and the value that Americans
place on it warrants greater protection by the Court of certain
activity that occurs in the home.23 5
"Statutes banning public sexual activity are entirely consistent with protecting the individual's liberty interest in decisions
concerning sexual relations."2
Justice Blackmun stated that
"the same recognition that those decisions are intensely private
which justifies protecting them from governmental interference
can justify protecting individuals from unwilling exposure to the
sexual activities of others."2 7 In Bowers, no interference with
231. Id. (citing H.L.A. Hart, Immorality and Treason, reprinted in THE LAW AS
LITERATURE 220, 225 (L. Blom-Cooper ed. 1961)). This seems to be a very valid point.
Would anyone suggest that citizens of those states which have repealed laws banning
sodomy between consenting adults are less moral than citizens of the State of Georgia?
232. Id. For example, laws that make it criminal for individuals to expose themselves
in public, protect public sensibilities. In such a situation the state is protecting the public sensibilities of its citizens as opposed to the liberty interest of the exhibitionist.
233. In Paris Adult Theatre I, owners of an "adult" movie theatre challenged a Georgia statute which made the exhibition of obscene movies a crime (the same statute as
applied in Stanley). The Court held that obscene material is not entitled to protection
under the first amendment as a form of free speech and that the state has a legitimate
interest in regulating the commerce of obscene materials and its exhibition in places of
public accommodation. 413 U.S. at 54, 57-69.
234. Id. at 66.
235. Justice Burger writing for the majority in Paris Adult Theatre I held, "[olur
Constitution establishes a broad range of conditions on the exercise of power by the
states, but for us to say that our constitution incorporates the proposition that conduct
involving consenting adults only is beyond state regulation, is a step we are unwilling to
take." Id. at 68. Some thirteen years later the Court is still unwilling to take that step.
While it may be a great step to take, the Court doesn't even attempt to get any "footing." The Court makes no compromise in its decision. While it is reasonable to assert
that not all consensual activity between adults is beyond the reach of state power, it is
also reasonable to assert that certain situations involving consenting adults should be
free of governmental intrusion.
236. 106 S. Ct. at 2855.
237. Id. See also, Raphael v. Hogan, 305 F. Supp. 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976).
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the rights of others is implicated by allowing consensual sodomy
to occur in the home. The fact that sodomy may be distasteful
to some people does not present a compelling state interest supporting the validity of the statute.2 38 For Justice Blackmun,
Bowers "involves no real interference with the rights of others,
for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not adhere to
one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable interest."23
Justice Blackmun concluded that it is his hope that:
[The] Court soon will reconsider its analysis and conclude that depriving individuals of the right to . .. conduct their intimate relationships poses a far greater
threat to the values most deeply rooted in our Nation's
history than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do.2 "
2.

Justice Stevens

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
dissented from the majority opinion basing his dissent on the
belief that the sodomy statute violates the equal protection
clause.2" 1 Justice Stevens' reading of Griswold is that the right of
marital privacy extends to acts of sodomy.2 2 Justice Stevens begins his analysis by posing two questions necessary for consideration of the constitutionality of the statute." 3 The first question
is, "may a state totally prohibit the described conduct by means
of a neutral law applying without exception to all persons subject to its jurisdiction?" ' The second question is, "[i]f not, may
238. Justice Blackmun stated, "the mere fact that intimate behavior may be punished when it takes place in public cannot dictate how States can regulate intimate behavior in intimate places." 106 S. Ct. at 2855.
239. Id. at 2856. Justice Blackmun strikes at the very heart of the controversy. He
would have no problem with the majority opinion if it sought to ban public displays of
sodomy (i.e., in a public park or public restroom). However, the crux of Justice Blackmun's argument is that no moral justification exists for banning certain consensual sexual adult activity in the home. The mere fact that others in the community, even if a
majority, find sodomy distasteful is not compelling enough to ban individuals from participating in the activity in their home. The fact that certain individuals do not adhere to
the value system of others does not warrant a justification for the state's right to proscribe sodomy.
240. Id.; accord Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
241. 106 S. Ct. at 2857.
242. Id. at 2858.
243. Id. at 2857.
244. Id.
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the State save the statute by announcing that it will only enforce the law against homosexuals? ' 1"5
In answering the first question posed, Justice Stevens asserted that prior precedent has made two propositions abundantly clear. 24 First, "the fact that the governing majority in a
State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is
not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice. 247 Second, "individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when
not intended to produce offspring, . . . are protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."2 8 The Georgia
statute as it stands could therefore not be enforced against married couples due to the right of marital privacy. 49 This same
protection is afforded to unmarried individuals by way of Eisenstadt and Carey.2 50 "The essential 'liberty' that animated the
development of law in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadtand Carey
surely embraces the right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual
conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral." 2 5
Reasoning that Georgia could not enforce the statute
against married or unmarried couples, Justice Stevens asserted
that Georgia must carry the burden of justifying why it would
selectively apply the statute to homosexuals.2 5 2 The record in
Bowers indicates no substantial relationship to exist: "Either the
persons to whom Georgia seeks to apply its statute do not have
the same interest in 'liberty' that others have, or there must be a
compelling reason why the state may apply a generally applicable law to certain persons that it does not to others." 53 To Justice Stevens, both possibilities are unacceptable because it is obvious that both homosexuals and heterosexuals have the same
245. 106 S.Ct. at 2857.
246. Id.
247. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
248. Id. (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
249. 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. Although Justice Stevens does not refer to it here, Justice Powell contended
in his concurrence to Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring)
that the selective application of a law based on gender must bear "a fair and substantial
rational relation to the state's asserted objective." Id.
253. 106 S. Ct. at 2858.
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interest in liberty. 25 4 Thus, Justice Stevens addressed three factors which led him to conclude that the statute is void: 1) the
failure of the Georgia prosecutor to prosecute the respondent
even in view of the fact that Hardwick admitted to having engaged in sodomy and admitted that he would engage in it in the
future;255 2) Georgia's failure to enforce the statute for decades; 25 and 3) the failure of the petitioner to advance any argument which justified selective enforcement of the statute
against homosexuals. 57
Similar arguments were invoked in Eisenstadt and Carey.
The critical determination for the Court to make in Eisenstadt
was whether some rational ground existed that explained the
different treatment accorded married and unmarried individuals
regarding their respective rights to contraception. 2

8

The Court

held that deterrence of pre-marital sex was just as ineffective a
rationale for the anti-contraception law as was the justification
of deterring extra-marital sexual relations invoked in
Griswold. 9
Expanding upon the principles enunciated in Eisenstadt
and Griswold, the Carey Court pronounced that the issues dealt
with in those cases were not whether a fundamental right to contraception exists, but whether a fundamental right of access to
contraception is "essential for the exercise of the constitution'20
ally protected right of decisions in matters of child bearing.
The Court also held that the state advanced no argument compelling enough to justify barring minors access to contraception
while allowing its sale to adults. 61
254. Id. State intrusions into the private conduct of either is equally burdensome.
255. Id. at 2859.
256. Id. at 2859 n.l. The last prosecution in Georgia for violation of the statute was
in 1939. Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799 (1939).
257. 106 S. Ct. at 2859.
258. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 447.
259. Id.
260. Carey, 431 U.S. at 688-89.
261. Id. at 694. The Carey.court pointed to Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) to justify its holding that minors have the right to contraception. Danforth extended the right to have an abortion to minors. The Carey court
reasoned that if a state could not impose restrictions on the right of minor to have an

abortion, it could not restrict the right of a minor to obtain access to contraceptives. The
state's interest in the protection of the mental and physical health of the pregnant
mother and in protection of potential early life are clearly more implicated by the abor-
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Justice Stevens, concurring in Carey, found fault in the majority's analysis analogizing the right to contraception with the
right of abortion as it related to minors.2 62 He explained that the
constitutional rights which protect a minor's right to an abortion
do not afford the same protection as to the use of contraceptives.2 3 Instead, Justice Stevens asserted that "the statutory
prohibition [allowing access to contraceptives by minors] denies
them and their parents a choice which if available would reduce
their exposure to disease or unwarranted pregnancy. "264
The doctrinal developments which emerge from the line of
privacy cases is that the right of choice is a fundamental right
extending to all individuals, married or unmarried, adult or minor.26 Similarly in Bowers, the issue is not whether a fundamental right to engage in sodomy exists, but whether the right to
decide and choose the nature of one's own intimate interpersonal relationships exists, and whether this right extends only to
heterosexuals, thus, excluding homosexuals. 6 6 To Justice Stevens, the inability of the state of Georgia to justify selective application of the statute to homosexuals as opposed to heterosexuals warranted an affirmation of the district court decision.26 7
CONCLUSION

Do we have the "right to be let alone" as Justice Brandeis
enunciated in Olmstead v. United States,2 66 or does the government have the power to regulate consensual behavior of adults
within the confines of their home? Bowers leaves many issues
unresolved. For example, because of the failure of the Court to
address the sodomy law on equal protection grounds, the public
tion decision than by the decision to use a nonhazardous contraceptive.
262. 431 U.S. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 714 (emphasis added). The right of personal choice is crucial in all right of
privacy cases.
265. The issues in Eisenstadt and Carey both deal with a right to choose whether or
not to bear children. The decision in Carey conferred such right upon minors.
266. The equal protection clause has been used by several states to overturn sodomy
laws. See People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y. 2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981); Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47
(1980). See also The Constitutionality of Sodomy Statutes, supra note 72, at 585-92.
267. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2859.
268. 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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is left to ponder why the statute may be selectively enforced
against homosexuals. The Court also failed to address any questions of whether the eighth or ninth amendments are violated by
the statute.
The majority's justification of its position that no fundamental right to engage in sodomy exists is weak at best. Justice
White held that the Court would not invalidate the statute because to do so would invalidate the laws of some twenty-three
other states and the District of Columbia which currently enforce sodomy statutes.26 9 Surely Justice White does not suggest
that the number of states which have the same or similar statute
on their books is determinative of whether that statute is constitutional. It is the merits of the statute which should determine
its constitutional validity and not the number of states which
currently retain the same or similar statutes in their codes. It is
quite possible that all those states could be wrong. It would also
be a sad commentary were the Court to simply uphold a statute
simply because it has existed for a prolonged period of time.
Further, the majority's failure to recognize a trend among the
states to repeal consensual sodomy laws is representative of a
Court that pays little attention to public attitudes, especially
when claiming to pay attention to these attitudes.2 7
What we must realize is that the Constitution is a constantly evolving instrument. Examining the intent of the framers
in constitutional analysis must be reconciled with the needs and
desires of an ever changing and growing society. We should not
stagnate in the ideology and often archaic reasoning of the past
but should evaluate constitutional concepts in terms of the
needs, desires, choices and goals of the people of today. The
Constitution must serve to define and mandate the fundamental
rights common to all people.
Bowers seemingly is a retreat from the evolution of a privacy doctrine which gives all Americans the right of personal
choice regarding consensual intimate relationships. We must always question a court's decision which denies an individual his
right to make a personal choice about the nature of his intimate
relationships. We must further be alarmed when a court decides
269.
270.

106 S. Ct. at 2845.
Since 1961, over half the states have repealed their sodomy laws. Id.
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that the physical expression involved in an intimate interpersonal relationship involving consenting adults can be restricted
by the state, within the confines of one's home. We also must
query just how far Bowers may reach in curtailing the right of
privacy and the right we have to be let alone.27 '
Paul L. Alpert

271. The failure of the Court to resolve the equal protection clause issue or any
eighth or ninth amendment violations seems to indicate that the controversy over the
constitutionality of sodomy laws is far from over. It seems very likely that these issues
will be resolved in the near future.

